









Citation for published version (Harvard):
Schaffer, G 2018, 'The limits of the ‘Liberal imagination’: Britain, broadcasting, and apartheid South Africa, 1948-
1994', Past & Present, vol. 240, no. 1, pp. 235–266. https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gty005
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Past and Present following peer review. The version
of record Gavin Schaffer, The Limits of the ‘Liberal Imagination’: Britain, Broadcasting and Apartheid South Africa, 1948–1994, Past &
Present, Volume 240, Issue 1, August 2018, Pages 235–266, is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gty005article/doi/10.1093/pastj/gty005/4965957
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 11. May. 2021
 1 
The Limits of the ‘Liberal Imagination’: Britain, Broadcasting, and Apartheid South 
Africa, 1948-94 
 
On the 14th May 1987, the BBC’s Africa correspondent, Michael Buerk, alongside his 
Independent Television News rival Peter Sharpe, received written notice of the 
decision of the South African government not to renew their work permits.  
Respectively in post for four and eight years, Buerk and Sharpe were given ten days 
to leave the country.1 While these high-profile expulsions led to a crescendo of 
international outcry, the refusal of visas to foreign journalists in South Africa had by 
this point been going on for well over a decade.2  Consistently, the apartheid regime 
justified their actions by alleging that foreign journalists were enemies of the nation, 
instigating protest where it did not exist and goading opposition forces into action.   In 
response, time and again, South Africa banned, arrested and intimidated foreign 
journalists, a phenomenon that came to a boiling point after the declaration of a State 
of Emergency in 1985.   
 
In the dying throes of apartheid, the regime tried to prevent international news 
organisations en masse from reporting in South Africa.3 For journalists that remained, 
not only was there the constant threat of state violence to contend with (as well as a 
broader culture of violence) but also the threat of jail (the maximum penalty for 
                                                        
1 David Beresford, ‘South Africa Expels British TV Men’, The Guardian, 15 May.1987. 
2 See, for example, the refusal to give visas to This Week journalists, cited below (fn 78). 
3 BBC Written Archives Centre (WAC), Caversham, Reading.  WAC, R78/3, 124/1, South Africa, Board 
of Management minutes, 18 Nov. 1985. 
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breaching emergency regulations was a ten year prison sentence).4   Through these 
tactics, by the late 1980s the South African regime had succeeded in undermining 
news broadcasts and preventing international media from making current affairs 
programmes about apartheid.  The Foreign Editor of BBC Television News informed 
colleagues in 1988 that South African policy had ‘in effect wiped out BBC current 
affairs’.5  To BBC South Africa radio correspondent Graham Leach, ‘Pretoria [had] 
won’.  He bemoaned:  ‘The television protests of black protests have disappeared 
from the world’s television screens’.6  
 
This article explores the responses of the British broadcast media to this state of 
affairs, and to the apartheid regime over its lifespan, making the argument that 
broadcasting offers particular insights into the British state’s interactions with 
apartheid and extreme regimes more generally in the postcolonial period.    Reading 
British state values from broadcasting is tempting because of the extent to which 
British broadcasters, especially the BBC, have been seen, and have seen themselves, 
as part of the nation’s structure of governance.  Of course, some areas of broadcasting 
such as the BBC World Service, until recently at least, were directly funded by the 
government, leading Cannadine to describe it as ‘the Empire of the air’.7  More 
generally, Seaton has analysed the BBC ‘as part of the constitutional arrangements of 
                                                        
4 Michael Buerk, The Road Taken: an Autobiography (London, 2004), 321. 
5 WAC, R78/3, 125/1, South Africa, John Mahoney’s notes for L Hodgson, Briefing Paper in 
Preparation for the Dinner for the South African Ambassador, 18 Feb. 1988. 
6 WAC, R78/3, 125/1, South Africa,  Leach’s notes for L Hodgson, Briefing Paper in Preparation for the 
Dinner for the South African Ambassador, 18 Feb. 1988. 
7David Cannadine, Ornamentalism:  How the British Saw their Empire (London, 2001), 191. 
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the nation’ and this certainly seems to reflect the way that its journalists were seen 
abroad.8  Michael Buerk recalled that BBC correspondents in South Africa ‘were 
treated like alternative British ambassadors’.9   
 
The contents of television or radio programmes, in-and-of-themselves, tell us little 
about the views of the British government and we should be slow to assume that 
broadcasting had the power to change or shape public opinion.10  But broadcasting 
was a terrain of political debate and conflict, a space that was fought over by those 
inside and outside the industry.11 Those who had a view on South Africa and 
apartheid frequently tried to express it through broadcasting and correspondingly 
often attempted to suppress the views of adversaries, amid strongly held beliefs that 
television could effect change.  
 
Meanwhile, driven by a specific understanding of British values, the BBC and 
independent channels strove to present what they considered to be a balanced and 
objective analysis of apartheid, the thinking behind which tells us much, this article 
will argue, about broader state responses to the South African regime.  Tensioned by a 
                                                        
8 J. Seaton, ‘The BBC and the “Hidden Wiring” of the British Constitution:  the Imposition of the 
Broadcasting Ban in 1988’, Twentieth Century British History, xxiv:iii (2013), 448-71, 469. 
9 Buerk, The Road Taken, 222-3. 
10  See David Morley, Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies (London and New York, 1992), S. Hall, 
‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
Occasional Paper, Sept. 1973 and D. Morrison, ‘Cultural and Moral Authority:  the Presumption of 
Television’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, dcxxv, (2009), 116-27. 
11 L. Black, ‘Whose Finger on the Button?  British Television and the Politics of Cultural Control’, 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, xxv:iv, (2005), 547-75. 
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complicated moral and legal position relating to the need for broadcasting neutrality, 
and underwritten by a specific postcolonial sensibility, clear opposition to apartheid 
struggled to emerge on British television and radio.  Indeed, this article argues, British 
broadcasters, and Britain more generally, ultimately failed to understand the brutal 
realities of apartheid or to articulate opposition to it.  
 
The British state’s relationship with Apartheid was shaped by long-standing British 
ambivalence on race and empire, affinity with South African whites and business 
interests, while the fear of the Cold War (and Communist infiltration) similarly 
ensured the continuation of a positive relationship between Britain and South Africa 
during these years; but underpinning all of the above considerations, I argue, was the 
British ‘liberal imagination’.  Lionel Trilling explained the ‘liberal imagination’ as a 
mind frame that ‘unconsciously limit[ed] its view of the world to what it can deal 
with’, evading the horrors of extremism.12    
 
The idea that responses to extreme regimes are governed by incomprehension has 
been signposted within the historical analysis of trauma, especially with reference to 
the Holocaust.    Listening to Holocaust testimony, documentary maker Claude 
Lanzmann explained, drove a ‘refusal of understanding’ on his part, which became 
the only ‘ethical’ and ‘only possible’ attitude towards the horror stories he 
                                                        
12 See Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination:  Essays on Literature and Society (Oxford, 1981), p.v. 
This analysis follows Tony Kushner’s reading of Trilling with regards to British responses to the 
Holocaust in The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination:  a Social and Cultural History (Oxford, 1994), 
272-3.   
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encountered.13   As Felman has argued, experiences outside a person’s ‘frame of 
reference’ remain ‘historically invisible, unreal, and can only be encountered by a 
systematic disbelief’.14  Similar responses within post-Apartheid South Africa shaped 
the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee.  In this forum, as one committee 
member attested, the words of survivors could only distance the committee from 
actual events, ‘limiting our participation in the act of remembering’.15  
 
 On the terms of the ‘liberal imagination’, South African apartheid was understood by 
postwar British governments with reference to the nation’s own experiences, 
specifically of British imperial governance.16  The mediation of television could and 
sometimes did push the boundaries of this imagination, as fictionalised forms, ‘an 
imaginative medium’, could burst bubbles of incomprehension with stories and visual 
images.17  Yet, whatever its potential, the production of television mostly sought to 
                                                        
13 Lanzmann cited in Cathy Caruth (ed), Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore and London, 
1995), 155. 
14 Shoshana Felman, ‘Camus’ The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing’ in Shoshana Felman and Dori 
Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (New York and 
London, 1992), 93-119, 103.   
15 Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, A Human Being Died that Night: a South African Story of Forgiveness 
(Boston and New York, 2003), 85. 
16 Jon Lawrence, ‘Paternalism, Class and the British Path to Modernity’ in Simon Gunn and James 
Vernon (eds.), The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain (Berkeley, LA and London, 
2011), 147-64, 147.  Also see Cannadine, Ornamentalism, xiv. 
17 Felman, ‘Camus’ The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing’, 105. 
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rationalise apartheid and control graphic images, maintaining imaginative constraints 
on what the nation did and didn’t see. 
 
Britain, Opposition to Apartheid and the ‘Liberal Imagination’ 
 
While some fought long and hard against apartheid, British responses at all levels 
were mostly equivocal, hostile to apartheid ideology but simultaneously uncertain that 
the regime was all bad, or entirely responsible for the state South Africa was in.  
Attitudes towards the regime, and the racial concepts which underpinned it, were not 
static, but British positions in government and civil society over the lifespan of 
apartheid remained fairly consistent, described across various Governments by Hyam 
and Henshaw in terms of ‘‘rise, ebb, and resurgence’.18  Over the course of the 
regime, British government criticism of South Africa’s racial policies tended to be 
muted and focused on what was perceived to be excessive or extreme violence, 
though even on these terms there was a tendency to defer to the wisdom of the 
apartheid state on how it was best to deal with its un-franchised Black population.19  
This mode of thinking ensured both that apartheid would rarely be welcomed, but also 
that its inherent unreason and murderous mentality would not be fully understood in 
                                                        
18 Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok:  Britain and South Africa since the 
Boer War (Cambridge, 2003), 307.  Also see Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid:  a History of a 
Movement in Britain (London, 2005), 157 and Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal 
Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, c.1919-64 (Basingstoke 
and New York, 2010), 156. 
19 See, for example, the House of Lords Debate on ‘South Africa and the Commonwealth’ in the 
aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre and South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth.  
Hansard (Lords), Vol: 229 Cols: 1255-334, 31 Mar. 1961. 
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Britain, as politicians instead attempted to rationalise apartheid within a British 
weltanschauung.    
 
British interventions mostly championed a middle position of moderation, neither 
embracing the Apartheid State nor the forces bent on its overthrow. Churches and 
Trade Unions sought dialogue with their white equivalents and gave minimal 
encouragement to the idea of Black majority rule.20  At government level, the 
conciliatory if critical position taken by Britain at the United Nations in 1963 
remained consistent until the late 1980s.  ‘Ought we not to give consideration’, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Peter Thomas asked the UN’s Special 
Committee on the policies of Apartheid, ‘to the possibilities of finding some bridge, 
some compromise between the ultimate objectives of the South African 
government…and the concept of fully multi-racial society’.21  In this mind-frame, 
Black opponents of the regime were frequently cast as just as intransigent and 
dangerous as staunch supporters of apartheid.   In 1957, the British High Commission 
described the increased radicalism of Black challenges to apartheid as ‘one of the 
saddest developments’ in the country.22  Thirty years later, Thatcher still saw fit to 
dismiss the ANC as a ‘typical terrorist organisation’.23 
                                                        
20 On the position of Trade Unions, see J. Major, ‘The Trades Union Congress and Apartheid, 1948-70’, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, (2005), xxxi:iii, 477-93.  Skinner cites Church responses in 
comparison in The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, 142. 
21 National Archives of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Kew, London (NA), DO181/1, Speech by 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid, 18 Oct. 
1963. 
22 NA, DO35/10559, RH Belcher, Office of the High Commission in South Africa to Sir Charles Dixon, 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 29 Jul. 1957. 
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In this mind frame, the damage caused to British/South African relations by the onset 
of apartheid was neither immediate nor total. Daniel Malan’s election victory in 1948 
marked a triumph for Afrikaner Nationalism and a challenge to postwar international 
trends towards anti-racism and decolonisation.24  It did not, however, trigger an 
immediate falling out with a British government which was sufficiently motivated by 
a desire to maintain the Commonwealth and protect its interests, and had no urgent 
desire to take a stand for South Africa’s Black majority.25  As Dubow has argued, 
British governments may have seen apartheid as ‘regrettable and probably 
unworkable but offset this discomfort by insisting that maintaining good relations 
with the country was vital’.26 
 
Ambivalence towards the apartheid state was partly driven by realpolitik, nurtured by 
trade and investment vital to Britain’s economy, and protected by South Africa’s 
utility as an ally in the Cold War.27 Yet these very real political and economic 
foundations of friendship were underpinned by a deeper rationale, undervalued in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
23 Andrew McEwan, ‘Thatcher Hits Back in Row on Sanctions’, The Times, 19 Oct. 1987. 
24 See Ryan Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (Oxford, 
2012) 6. 
25 Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok, 153-4. 
26 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford, 2014), 51.  Also see Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-
Apartheid, 118. 
27 Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion…,p.255.  Belich has argued that British investment accounted for 62% 
of overall foreign investment in South Africa in 1956 in James Belich, Replenishing the Earth:  The 
Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld (Oxford, 2009),386.  Also see Irwin, Gordian Knot, 
135. 
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existing historical analysis of the relationship between the two States, rooted in the 
idiosyncrasies of British imperial thinking on race and decolonisation. British 
imperial approaches to racial difference were not the same as those of the apartheid 
state, but there were considerable similarities surrounding concepts of white 
superiority and the need for white stewardship of Black and Asian populations. After 
all, as Cannadine has argued, the mentality of the British Empire had always carried 
its own ideas of racial ‘superiority and inferiority’.28 On these terms, Schwarz has 
noted that apartheid was ‘no last-minute imposition’ by Afrikaner Nationalists, ‘but 
the founding principle on which the Union of South Africa…was created, and 
sanctified by Westminster’.29 Leon de Kock has concluded that the apartheid regime 
‘merely took the terms inherited from an earlier, compromised era of English 
liberalism and changed the pattern of the seam’.30  A paper written in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office in 1959 on South Africa’s ‘Racial Policy’ confirmed 
this affinity.  ‘The Nationalist Party’s policy of apartheid is a development of the 
policy, followed by South African governments since 1910, of the separation of the 
races to avoid racial friction and to ensure the maintenance of “White South Africa” 
against the great preponderance of non-White peoples’.31 
 
                                                        
28 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p.123.   
29 Bill Schwarz, Memories of Empire, Volume 1: The White Man’s World (Oxford, 2011), 212. 
30 Leon de Kock, Louise Bethlehem and Sonja Laden (eds.), South Africa in the Global Imaginary 
(Pretoria, 2004), 16. 
31 NA, DO35/10559, Paper by the Commonwealth Relations Office on ‘South African Government’s 
Racial Policy’, 19 Feb. 1959. 
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Ostensibly, the most significant difference between British and apartheid thinking on 
race relations related to the principle of ‘gradualism’ that dominated much of British 
‘liberal’ imperial rhetoric.32  According to this principle, Black and Asian populations 
within the Empire were constructed as aspiring to the standards of British civilisation, 
which would ultimately yield for them equality and self-governance, but allowed for 
their designation as ‘legitimate objects of liberal intervention’ in the meantime.33 
Self-government for Black and Asian populations was imagined over the longue 
durée by many British imperialists, but this nonetheless differentiated British 
approaches to those of apartheid ideologues, who mostly saw racial differences as 
inherent and permanent, with separate development being the answer.34 On these 
terms, Irwin has presented the intellectual vision of apartheid as anathema to western 
liberalism, a vision of the future that drew ‘a sharp line between the Union and the 
world community’.35  
 
                                                        
32 See Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination (London, 
2002), 17 and A. Sartori, ‘The British Empire and its Liberal Mission’, Journal of Modern History,  
(2006), lxxii: iii, 78:3, 623-42, 633. 
33 G. Harrison, ‘Campaign Africa:  Exploring the Relationship of Africa and its Role in British Identity’, 
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, xv:iv, (2013), 528-47, 533 and Gunn and 
Vernon, The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity, 9. 
34 For imperial thinking on the necessarily slow pace of Black/Asian self-rule see P. Cain, ‘Character, 
“Ordered Liberty”, and the Mission to Civilise:  British Moral Justification of Empire, 1870-1914’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xl:iv (2012), 557-78, 566.  For apartheid thinking on 
racial difference see Aletta Norval, Understanding Apartheid Discourse (London and New York, 1996). 
35 Irwin, Gordian Knot, 20. 
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Indeed, the reluctance of the apartheid state to countenance the idea of a colour-blind 
society as envisaged in the ANC’s Freedom Charter, even as a future goal, was 
perceived by Britain and the United States as out of step with the times, a difference 
of opinion that was brought to world attention by Harold Macmillan’s ‘Winds of 
Change’ speech to the South African parliament in 1960.36  The extent of this 
disagreement, however, should not be overstated.  Consistently, as Schwarz has 
noted, British politicians deferred to those in the Empire who ‘knew the native’.37 
After all, as the British Permanent Representative told the UN Security Council in 
1963, if Apartheid was to be considered ‘sui generis’ then it was important to 
recognise that the racial ‘situation’ in South Africa was itself ‘sui generis’.38 
Ultimately, Britain’s racial critique of South Africa can be defined in terms of the 
nation’s own ambivalence on race, grounded in centuries of ‘liberal’ Empire, which 
had always justified discrimination, and articulated racial equality only in a far-away 
imagined future. 
 
Despite the British government’s equivocal position on South Africa, hostility to 
apartheid grew in other parts of British society through the 1950s, and developed into 
some sustained and significant blocks of opposition by the 1960s.39  Opponents of 
apartheid were inspired to act by the accelerating violence of the South African state 
                                                        
36 See Dubow, Apartheid, 74-5, Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion… 34-5  and Irwin, Gordian Knot, 19. 
37 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 22-3. 
38 NA, DO 181/1, Speech by Sir Patrick Dean to the UN Security Council, 4 Dec. 1963. 38  
38 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 22-3. 
38 NA, DO 181/1, Speech by Sir Patrick Dean to the UN Security Council, 4 Dec. 1963. 
39 See Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 4-66 and Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid, 118-55. 
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(epitomised in the Sharpeville and Langa Massacre of 1960) and the growing 
international opposition to the regime.  Indeed, opposition to the extremism of the 
apartheid government has led Webster to conclude that Britain as a whole ‘re-
established liberal credentials’ through ‘the condemnation of apartheid’.40  Similarly, 
Harrison has argued that British liberal values clearly constructed South Africa’s 
brand of racism as beyond the pale.  ‘From any kind of liberal perspective, apartheid 
was sufficiently heinous to endorse a wide range of actions to undermine it’.41   
 
This article argues that claims of this nature are significantly overstated.  While it is 
undoubtedly true that protest against apartheid peaked at moments of crisis such as 
Sharpeville, neither the British state nor the public moved decisively towards anti-
apartheid over the course of the regime, a position rooted, I shall argue, in a failure to 
understand the regime’s true nature.  As late as 1982 the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
still saw its ‘greatest challenge’ in terms of creating in Britain ‘a much more active 
climate of concern’ about South Africa.  Support, it noted, was still difficult to come 
by at ‘a local level’.42 The limits of public anti-Apartheid sentiment was similarly 
understood within the Civil Service.  Writing to the Consulate General in 
Johannesburg in 1983, Jeremy Varcoe (from the Foreign Office’s South Africa 
                                                        
40 W. Webster, Englishness and Empire (Oxford, 2007), 177. 
41 Harrison, ‘Campaign Africa…’, 539. 
42 London Metropolitan Archives, Anti-Apartheid Movement MSS (London), LMA/4421/01/01/03, ‘A 
Campaigning Framework’, Sept 1982-Dec. 1983. 
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Department) explained:  ‘The average man on the proverbial Clapham Omnibus is 
probably by inclination only concerned that Test Cricket should continue’.43 
 
While different administrations in Britain were varyingly oppositional to the apartheid 
regime, Britain’s overall stance remained that of a critical friend, an on-going 
relationship reflected in Margaret Thatcher’s reluctance to increase sanctions against 
South Africa in the 1980s, a decision which the Anti-Apartheid movement claimed 
‘encouraged’ and gave ‘comfort’ to the regime.44   British liberal values, this article 
will argue, in fact mostly prevented the regime from being seen, and dealt with, as the 
brutal international pariah that it was (despite the anti-apartheid stance of some 
Britons).   Ultimately, a perceived familial affinity between the two states fuelled a 
sustained relationship between Britain and South Africa, and preserved a closeness 
that was evident in the evolution of South African broadcasting. 
 
Affinity and Uncertainty:  Broadcaster and State on South Africa 
 
In broadcasting, as between states, relations between Britain and South Africa were 
built on long colonial foundations of cooperation and conflict. The scars of British 
atrocities in the Boer Wars, alongside on-going discrimination against Afrikaner 
language and culture, ensured there was no love lost between Britain and most 
Afrikaner Nationalists. Nonetheless, in excess of a third of South Africa’s white 
population were expatriate Britons who continued to identify with the old country to 
                                                        
43 NA, FO105/1519, Jeremy Varcoe to CT Brant, 19 Apr. 1983.  Varcoe went on to note that the ‘fair 
play’ of the average Briton ‘can be invoked’.  
44 LMA/4421/01/01/001, Annual General Meeting of the AAM, Resolutions Adopted, 28 Oct. 1984. 
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varying extents, in many cases more than they identified with South Africa itself.45  
This sense of affinity was not unidirectional, and was underpinned by South African 
service in the First and Second World Wars.  South Africa’s white population, 
alongside other ‘white’ Commonwealth nations, was constructed as familiar in 
postwar Britain through the language of ‘stock, blood, family’, in what Schwarz has 
described as a ‘sort of ethnic populism’, which fed the ‘liberal imagination’ at every 
turn.46 Even after South Africa’s 1961 departure from the Commonwealth, Sanders 
has noted, ‘its white population was consistently portrayed in the British media as 
being, to a certain extent, the responsibility of Great Britain’.47 
 
The foundations of the relationship between British and South African broadcasters 
were similarly built on bonds of colonial affinity, and only gradually eroded by the 
issue of apartheid.  Following an invitation from South African Prime Minister Barry 
Hertzog, the BBC’s first Director General, John Reith, visited South Africa to offer 
advice on national broadcasting in 1934, publishing a report on ‘Broadcasting and 
Development’ in South Africa in 1935.48  Reith’s report led to the reorganisation of 
South African broadcasting from disparate commercial roots into a united public 
                                                        
45 For details of British settlement in South Africa see Belich,  Replenishing the Earth, 373-83.   
46 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 59 and 71.  Bailkin has described this tendency in terms of the 
‘afterlife’ of Empire in Jordana Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley, 2012), 237.  Also see 
Webster, Englishness and Empire, 82, Hakan Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global 
Civil Society (Basingstoke and New York, 2006), 76 and Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 214. 
47 James Sanders, South Africa and the International Media 1972-9:  a Struggle for Representation 
(London, 2000), 211. 
48 See Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli and Johan Muller, Broadcasting in South Africa (London, 1989), 
31.  Reith’s report, ‘Broadcasting and Development’, is held in the WAC,  File E1/61, Countries:  Africa. 
 15 
service through the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which came 
into being on the 1st August 1936 following new legislation.49  The SABC was 
founded very much in the BBC’s image, with a statutory commitment to broadcasting 
impartiality, funded by licence fee.50 Potter has described it as a ‘BBC-style 
broadcasting authority’ while Harrison explains that the SABC ‘virtually adopted the 
BBC charter’.51 This closeness was clear to contemporaries.  According to the 
Johannesburg Star, Reith made ‘no recommendations’ to the South African 
government ‘that were not accepted’.52   
 
The relationship between the BBC and the SABC went beyond shared structures and 
policy.  Despite considerable conflict during the apartheid era, which will be 
discussed below, the SABC continued to mine heavily BBC material for its radio, and 
later television programming, to the extent that some Black South Africans, as late as 
1988, were unable to differentiate clearly between the two providers.  When BBC 
official Dorothy Grenfell-Williams visited the country, she reported back, ‘Some 
black South Africans I talked to gave me the impression that they thought the SABC 
and the BBC were branches of the same organisation’.53   
 
                                                        
49 Tomaselli, Tomaselli and Muller, Broadcasting in South Africa, 31. 
50 Broadcasting Act (Act 22), 1936.  South Africa adopted some commercially-funded broadcasting 
from the birth of Springbok Radio in 1950. 
51 Simon Potter, Broadcasting Empire: the BBC and the British World, 1922-70 (Oxford, 2012), 181 and 
David Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa:  South Africa in Perspective (London, 1981), 207. 
52 Johannesburg Star, 23 Jun. 1962. 
53 WAC, File R78/3, 125/1, South Africa, Note from Dorothy Grenfell-Williams (Acting Assistant Head 
of African Service), on her visit to South Africa, 22 Feb. 1988. 
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Without doubt, relations between British and South African broadcasting were 
strained by apartheid. From the South African perspective, the growing distance was 
evident from as early as 1950, when the SABC took the decision to stop broadcasting 
BBC news, a move described by Potter as a ‘sign of things to come’.54  But the key 
parting of ways came in 1959 when Piet Meyer was appointed Chairman of SABC’s 
Board of Control.  Meyer was a leading member of the Afrikaner Nationalist secret 
society, the Broederbond, becoming the organisation’s Chairman in 1960.55  His 
appointment at SABC signalled the South African government’s determination to use 
its broadcasting network as a political weapon.  Following the retirement of Gideon 
Roos as Director General in 1961, a man who had ‘clung to the Reithian ideal of the 
independence of broadcasting’, the path was clear for Meyer to create radio and later 
television which would serve to support the South African government and undermine 
opposition.56 As David Dimbleby explained in a BBC documentary about the 
Broederbond in 1979, when watching the SABC after 1960, ‘you can see there is a 
secret hand…a pattern of controlling things’.57 
 
Anti-Apartheid and the Principle of Broadcasting Neutrality 
 
                                                        
54 See Potter, Broadcasting Empire, 147 and Tomaselli, Tomaselli and Muller, Broadcasting in South 
Africa, 54.  Cricket commentator John Arlott claimed that it was a comment from him on BBC Radio’s 
‘Any Questions?’ programme in March 1950 which led the South Africans to stop broadcasting BBC 
news.  Arlott told audiences that the South African government was ‘predominately a Nazi one’.  See 
David Allen, Arlott:  the Authorised Biography (London, 1994), 145. 
55 Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa, 207. 
56 Tomaselli, Tomaselli and Muller, Broadcasting in South Africa, 56. 
57 White Tribe of Africa, ‘A Band of Brothers’, tx. 15 Jan. 1979. 
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Almost immediately after Gideon Roos’ departure the relationship between South 
African and British broadcasters soured significantly.  At the core of the problem lay 
allegations from the South African government that British broadcasters were not 
maintaining their own rules of impartiality when it came to covering the country.  As 
the South Africans well knew, both the BBC and ITV were committed to politically 
neutral news presentation by law and precedent.  Since the time of the Sykes 
Committee report of 1923 the BBC had committed itself to broadcasting that was free 
from ‘any suspicion of political bias’.58    In the Corporation’s Prescribing 
Memoranda (part of its Licence and Agreement) it vowed to maintain political 
neutrality, a promise reiterated periodically in formal letters between the BBC and the 
British government.59   For their part, the independent channels were bound by the 
Television Act of 1954 (and subsequent legislation) which committed broadcasters to 
present news with ‘due accuracy and impartiality’.60   
 
Furious at what was perceived to be the abandonment of its own agreed standards, 
SABC attacked BBC coverage of South Africa live on air in 1963.  A broadcast by 
Alexander Steward, who had been Director of Information at South Africa House in 
London between 1955-62, entitled ‘South Africa and the BBC’, accused the BBC of 
‘stack[ing] the cards’ against the South African government and behaving as ‘a law 
unto itself’.61  At the heart of SABC’s objection was the idea that the BBC had failed 
                                                        
58 Broadcasting Committee (1923), Cmnd 1951.   
59 Charles Curran, A Seamless Robe:  Broadcasting – Philosophy and Practice (London, 1979),.68-71. 
60 Television Act, 1954, Section 6, Subsections d and g.   
61 Steward published a polemical defence of apartheid entitled You are Wrong, Father Huddleston 
(London, 1956). 
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to be neutral.  Steward complained that the Corporation was ‘far from impartial in its 
selection of facts, or of the people or the programmes it chooses to describe situations 
about and of which it has already made up its mind’.62  Although in this instance one 
of the independent companies (Associated Rediffusion) was singled out for praise in 
contrast to the BBC, in general South African officials laid accusations of bias against 
all British television networks.  Time and again, from the 1960s to the end of the 
regime, officials at South Africa’s embassy challenged broadcasters over what they 
perceived as anti-government content in news and current affairs broadcasts.   Indeed, 
complaints came not only from the Embassy but also from pressure groups and 
parliamentarians that were either sympathisers with, and/or in the pay of, the South 
Africans.63  Consistently at the heart of South African protests was the claim that all 
that was wanted was broadcasting impartiality. In the face of what they considered to 
be unacceptably hostile coverage the South African regime refused visas to numerous 
journalists, who were also frequently victims of violence and harassment by the 
apartheid state. 
                                                        
62 WAC, E1/1 380/1, ‘South Africa and the BBC’, tx. 22 Mar. 1963.  For analysis see H.Smith, 
‘Apartheid, Sharpeville and “Impartiality”:  the Reporting of South Africa on BBC Television, 1948-61’, 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television , xiii:iii, (1993), 151-98. 
63 For example, a group named the ‘anti-demonstration organisation’ attempted to persuade the 
British government to prosecute the BBC under Race Relations legislation following a 1970 episode of 
Panorama.  NA, LO2/463, Race Relations Act (Section 6), Norman Baker to Frederick Elwyn Jones, 13 
May. 1970.  BBC officials were criticised by a group of Conservative MPs for the nature of 
broadcasting on South Africa in a House of Commons meeting in 1972.  WAC, R78/2 763/1, Meeting 
between Hill, Curran, and backbench Conservatives, 23 Feb.1972.   In the 1970s, the South African 
government spent 85 million Rand trying to influence the global media, a secret campaign that led to 
national scandal.   See Dubow, Apartheid, 191-2 and Sanders, South Africa…, 3. 
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While there is no doubt about the apartheid state’s brutality towards journalists, there 
nonetheless remains a question concerning whether or not South Africa had a case 
concerning the bias of the British media.  As Sanders has pointed out, the regime 
perceived itself as ‘engaged in a “war of representation”’ against anti-apartheid 
forces, who themselves were working very hard to influence foreign media against the 
regime.64   While South African endeavours carried more than a whiff of paranoia, the 
forces ranged against apartheid were substantial and influential.  These were 
epitomised by opposition within the United Nations, which had been transformed, 
Irwin explains, by the ‘sudden emergence of almost forty non-European states’ in the 
1960s.65  In 1963, the Africa Group in the United Nations submitted a successful 
resolution of principled objection to apartheid to the General Assembly, and secured 
the establishment of a UN special committee on the subject.66  Despite later 
retrenchment by Britain and the USA, pressure from the UN continued.67  A Centre 
against Apartheid was established in 1976, a new arms embargo secured in 1977, 
while 1978-9 was declared ‘International Anti-Apartheid Year’, to be marked by a 
global propaganda effort against the regime.  
 
The influence of this anti-apartheid campaign on the British broadcast media was 
questionable.  British broadcasters were instinctively underwhelmed by the UN’s 
                                                        
64 Sanders, South Africa…, 63-5. 
65 Irwin, Gordian Knot, 12. 
66 Irwin, Gordian Knot, 55-8. 
67 Irwin has argued that the Vietnam War and a broader fear of criticism in the UN led the USA to a 
more conservative position on apartheid by the end of the 1960s, Gordian Knot, 8.  
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position, which went against the grain of self-fashioned neutrality and their instinctive 
belief that there were two sides to the South African story.  The Director of News and 
Current Affairs at the BBC responded to the UN’s call for opposition:  ‘There was 
absolutely no doubt about the BBC’s attitude to any request that it should broadcast 
such information.  It was not a government organisation and did not broadcast 
propaganda’.68  This view was shared, without question, by executives in the 
independent networks, who similarly did not want their channels to be conduits of 
anti-apartheid agitation.69  Nonetheless, this commitment to British broadcasting 
neutrality was not a simple matter either in theory or practice.  
 
Specifically, British broadcasting’s commitment to neutrality was conditioned by an 
understanding among many executives and programme makers that there were some 
issues about which it was inappropriate to be neutral and impartial.  As Director 
General of the BBC, Hugh Carleton Greene, who had previously worked as Director 
of News and Current Affairs, famously articulated this idea in a 1965 speech on ‘The 
Conscience of the Programme Director’, putting on record an attitude which was 
already influential within news and current affairs broadcasting. 
 
Nor do I believe that we should be impartial about certain things like racialism 
or extreme forms of political belief...The actions and aspirations of those who 
proclaim these ideas are so clearly damaging to society, to peace and good 
order, even in their immediate effects, that to put at their disposal the 
                                                        
68 WAC, R3/60/2, News and Current Affairs minutes, RTL Francis, 17 Jan. 1978 
69 See ITA Archive, Special Collections, University of Bournemouth, File 3996150, IBA Meeting, 23 Feb. 
1978. 
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enormous power of broadcasting would be to conspire with them against 
society.70 
 
Having served in the Second World War supporting Allied propaganda, and been 
present at the liberation of Dachau concentration camp, Greene had strong ideas about 
giving broadcasting access to those who he perceived would undermine democracy.71 
The problem with his influential dictum concerned who did, and did not, fall within 
its scope. To many broadcasters and commentators, as we have seen more broadly in 
British politics and society, apartheid South Africa was an ally, making difficult if 
controversial decisions about how to handle race relations.  On these terms, the State 
did not deserve proscription under Greene’s dictum.  One Radio 3 broadcast in 1972 
complained that British coverage of South Africa lacked ‘political reality’.72  
Presented by journalist Robert Kernohan, the programme challenged the idea that 
South Africa should be considered exceptional and argued that British coverage was 
riddled with double standards.   
 
                                                        
70 H. Greene, ‘The Conscience of the Programme Director’, 1965.  Speech cited in WAC, R3/60/3, 
News and Current Affairs Meeting Minutes, 1 Feb. 1977 
71  Hugh Greene MSS,  University of Oxford, Dep c 900, Draft Manuscript, H. Greene, ‘The Rebuilding 
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72 WAC, R19/2 052/1, Access South Africa – ‘Vain Hopes and Double Standards’, tx. 21 Oct. 1972.  
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My complaint is that we are tolerant of black Africa’s attempt to find a 
political expression for its personality – while we regard the white African 
reaction as the abominable crime of the twentieth century.73 
 
Nearly 15 years later this argument continued to be made about coverage of South 
Africa.  One letter writer to the Telegraph, in 1986, complained that ‘every day’ there 
was ‘an anti-South Africa item on the BBC and ITV news, but nothing whatsoever 
about the other side of the story’.74   
 
Despite these concerns, it is unarguable that many news and current affairs 
programmes on both the BBC and ITV took a strong position on the apartheid state in 
the spirit of Greene’s dictum, producing output that was neither neutral nor objective 
on apartheid in any conventional sense, and which had the potential to challenge 
British incomprehension about the Apartheid regime.  John Arlott, as we have seen 
above, compared the South African regime to the Nazis on Any Questions?, a point of 
reference which was mined again in Richard Dimbleby’s description of the 
Sharpeville massacre for Panorama in 1960.  Dimbleby compared the aftermath of 
the massacre to scenes at the liberation of Belsen (from where he had famously 
reported), offering a powerful indictment of the apartheid regime in a broadcast 
which, Smith has argued, signposted a new level of anti-apartheid commitment in 
British broadcasting. Smith has noted, ‘If Richard Dimbleby…was prepared to 
compare Sharpeville with Belsen, the message was clear:  South African government 
                                                        
73 Ibid. 
74 Letter from Mr DJ Hastings, The Daily Telegraph, 11 Aug. 1986. 
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policy was not a matter about which the BBC could remain neutral’.75  While the 
presentation of the apartheid regime as Nazi was not common on British television it 
did happen for a third time in a schools broadcast in 1971.  Here, in a narrative about 
the racial classification of South African schoolgirl Sandra Laing, presenter Michael 
Smee told his audience that this kind of racism (as well as racism in Britain) ‘led 
Hitler and the Nazis to the murder of six million Jews’.76  Replying to an audience 
complaint about bias in the programme Smee defended his position with reference to 
the Greene dictum.   ‘Do you imagine there are two sides to all moral 
questions?...Apartheid is a political solution to a problem which most people in the 
world think is an immoral solution’.77 
 
On ITV, Thames television’s This Week series repeatedly attacked apartheid, much to 
the fury of the South African government who withdrew visas from the production 
team.78   One This Week episode challenged, through dramatic reconstruction, the 
death in custody of Stephen Biko, using fiction to hammer home a message that was 
                                                        
75 Smith, ‘Apartheid…’, 253. 
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difficult to convey in news and current affairs.79  This Week seemingly tried to appeal 
to the instincts of the British public, criticising the sporting ethics of the South 
African rugby team, a programme described by Conservative MP, and consistent 
defender of South Africa, Patrick Wall, as a ‘shocking misuse of sport to put over 
biased propaganda’.80   
 
Facing repeated challenges from the South African embassy, Thames television 
consistently defended their position in similar terms to Greene’s dictum.  Jeremy 
Isaacs explained to the ITA, ‘We have to accept sooner or later that reporters in 
television have minds of their own, and we cannot always be surprised if they express 
them, especially on a matter of conscience.’81   Public support was also given to This 
Week by the ITA itself, although this body was concerned that Thames was treading a 
fine line on impartiality.  While the ITA publicly defended the company against 
challenges from the South African embassy, in private its members were less sure 
about This Week’s position (as we shall see below).82 
 
At their most heated, current affairs programmes both on the BBC and ITV could and 
did pass as anti-apartheid propaganda.  This Week episode, ‘There is No Crisis’, 
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broadcast in 1976, was taken up and shown by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 
London and Ipswich.83  Similarly, BBC 2’s Man Alive documentary from 1970, ‘The 
End of Dialogue’, included anti-apartheid propaganda material created by the banned 
Pan Africanist Congress party.84  In local broadcasts, an even stronger position was 
sometimes adopted.  On BBC Radio London’s Black Londoners programme, a feature 
on three men condemned to death in South Africa in 1983 concluded with reporter 
Sonia Fraser outlining how people could express their opposition.  ‘If you want to 
demonstrate your solidarity for the struggle in South Africa, you can go to the 
Embassy in Trafalgar Square and join an all night vigil’.85  While this broadcast did 
include a snippet from a pre-recorded interview with Casper Venter from the South 
African Embassy, even this was not allowed to pass without comment.  To Venter’s 
argument that the international community did not protest about terrorism against 
South Africans, Black Londoners’ Ronnie Smith replied, ‘Does that sound like sour 
grapes to you?’86 
 
Programmes of this nature led to vociferous criticism from members of the British 
Conservative Party, some of whom went so far as to allege that the BBC had its own 
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foreign policy on South Africa.87  The heart of these complaints of bias, which 
resonated in the press too, held that it was not for broadcasters to take sides, but just 
to give information to enable the public to make up their own minds.  Writing in the 
Telegraph, Simon Heffer praised Peter Snow (contrasting him with Michael Buerk) 
on the basis that Snow ‘never forgets that his role is as a cypher between those who 
make the news and those who wish to learn it’.88   
 
This view was shared by many within British news and current affairs broadcasting.  
Minutes of discussion at the IBA in 1978 recorded ‘a general view among members 
that recent programmes about South Africa had not given a balanced picture of the 
situation in that country’.  Programmes must, the IBA concluded, give ‘the viewpoint 
of the South African government and its supporters…as well as that of its internal and 
external critics’.89  Commenting on a complaint from the South African embassy that 
its programmes had been biased against the regime, a senior executive at Thames 
Television, reassured the ambassador that it was ‘the firm and settled policy of 
Thames to maintain complete impartiality’.90  Underpinning this commitment was the 
idea that there were two sides to the South African story, thinking rooted in the 
‘liberal imagination’, which could not comprehend the irrational aggression of 
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apartheid.  When, in 1974, the BBC decided to broadcast an edited version of a Pan 
Africanist Congress film about the effects of South Africa’s homelands policy, Last 
Grave at Dimbaza, the Corporation, for balance, offered the South African 
government airtime to broadcast a film of identical length alongside.91  For the BBC, 
the South African government was morally entitled to defend itself against the anti-
apartheid narrative of Last Grave at Dimbaza. Production notes argued: 
 
The film deliberately leads its audience to believe that nothing but extreme 
poverty and degradation exists in the urban townships and in the rural 
Bantustans.  This is no more true than the picture of contented, well-nourished 
Africans that the South African government puts forward in its publications – 
but on what grounds does the BBC prefer to believe one version to the 
exclusion of the other?92 
 
The principle of neutrality sat heavily on British broadcasters and no-doubt softened 
criticism of the apartheid regime despite Greene’s dictum.  Even those who were 
outspoken opponents clearly felt that their criticism took them outside the comfort 
zone of their professional values.  Michael Buerk, who as we have seen was in-effect 
expelled from the country by the apartheid regime, recorded feeling uncomfortable 
when he received flowers from Neil and Glenys Kinnock on his return to Britain.  ‘It 
made me feel dishonest and a fraud, caught on the wrong side of all my barriers’. 
                                                        
91 The films were broadcast under the title ‘South Africa: Two Points of View’ as part of the Man Alive 
series, tx. 12 Dec.1974.  For alternative analysis see Sanders, South Africa and the International 
Media, 41. 
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Buerk continued:  ‘I was wedded to the old BBC ethos of detachment, of separating 
fact and opinion’.93 Without doubt, overt displays of anti-apartheid sentiment were 
not tolerated.  When in 1986 the BBC discovered that editorial assistant Sarah Crowe 
had sung the ‘Black’ national anthem, Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika, and made a clenched fist 
salute at a political meeting to commemorate the Kinross mine disaster (in which 177 
miners had lost their lives), she was dismissed and Greene’s dictum did not come to 
her aid.94  Board of Management minutes noted that while ‘the BBC had declared that 
it was not impartial in the matter of racism, the ADG [Assistant Director General],  
had pointed out that BBC journalists were expected to be non-participants in events 
they were covering’.95  
 
The style of broadcasting preferred in current affairs by executives at both the BBC 
and the ITA offered an anti-apartheid perspective with sufficient subtlety that 
allegations of bias could be denied.  Key within this approach was a documentary 
style in which the voice of the presenter receded, allowing (ostensibly) contributors to 
express their own views unfettered by the editorial steer of programme; ‘Afrikaners 
condemning themselves out of their own mouths’, as the ITA’s Bernard Sendall 
explained.96  This approach, however, inherently softened the presentation of the 
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regime, muting its extremism and humanising its perpetrators.  It was, through 
broadcasting, the ‘liberal imagination’ in action.  
 
The subtle approach had been lauded by television executives as early as 196097, and 
was exemplified by two sets of broadcasts on South Africa, the first by Hugh Burnett 
in 1968, and the second by David Dimbleby, broadcast in 1979 and 1980.  Burnett’s 
two 1968 documentaries, White Africa and The Heart of Apartheid, gave perspectives 
on apartheid respectively from the point of view of white and Black South Africans.  
Initially,  Burnett only made White Africa, which was broadcast in January 1968, but 
the success of the programme led him to add a further episode in the same style, 
giving a Black perspective, which was broadcast (alongside a repeat of White Africa) 
in September of the same year.98  
 
Burnett made his programmes by interviewing people introduced to him through 
contacts at the South African Foundation, having been put in touch with this quasi-
independent organisation through the South African embassy in London.99 Initially, 
executives at the BBC were concerned that this relationship might produce a pro-
apartheid offering.  Huw Wheldon, then Controller of Programmes, refused to sign-
off the production, believing that an early draft from Burnett looked like ‘a Party 
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Political Broadcast for the South African Government’.100 A note from Burnett, 
however, changed his mind.  He explained:  ‘if an openly anti-white South African 
commentary was added it would be a most unsubtle way of presenting a documentary.  
Any condemnation should flow out of their mouths, not ours’.101   
 
Despite initial scepticism the BBC were delighted with the programme.  After the 
broadcast, Wheldon wrote to Burnett.  ‘I saw WA this morning. Excellent.  I am very 
glad I saw it’.102  With minimal commentary, Burnett broadcast the views of the white 
South Africans that he had interviewed, set against images of ‘the countryside, streets 
and general detail that go to make up the country’.103  Given that the interviewees had 
been selected by an organisation signposted by the government, there was little scope 
for the South Africans to allege bias, but an anti-apartheid message nonetheless came 
through to British critics. Mary Malone, in the Daily Mirror, wrote that White Africa 
‘came through like a fiery bolt by the simplest of devices’. 104  
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Eleven years after Burnett’s documentaries, David Dimbleby made a five part series 
on Afrikaner culture and history, under the title of The White Tribe of Africa.105 
Unlike Burnett’s programmes, Dimbleby’s voice was prominent in the documentaries, 
as he interviewed both Black and white South Africans.  Similar to Burnett, however, 
Dimbleby’s criticism of the regime was muted, as he focused in the series on trying to 
discover the roots of Afrikaner thinking on apartheid.  As part of his analysis of 
Afrikaner attitudes, Dimbleby highlighted the role of Britain in shaping their 
ideology.  Recalling the Boer War, he explained how ‘their farms were laid waste.  
Wives and children herded into camps… [British tactics]…have never been 
forgotten.’106 
 
As was the case with Burnett’s programmes, Dimbleby’s measured approach was 
well received both by the BBC and critics.  Richard Last, in the Telegraph, praised 
the series for its ‘quiet deliberation’, while the Daily Express’s critic commented that 
Dimbleby ‘leant over backwards trying to be fair’.107   Within the BBC, the 
Corporation’s Director of News and Current Affairs described The White Tribe of 
Africa as ‘distinguished and very illuminating’.108   
 
The Limits of the ‘Liberal Imagination’ 
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Not everyone, however, was similarly impressed by these subtle critiques of 
apartheid, which, I argue, were underwritten, like British attitudes more generally, by 
the prevalence of the ‘liberal imagination’.  Looking back, James Sanders criticised 
The White Tribe of Africa as ‘retrogressive and confusing’.109  While the anti-
apartheid movement was trying to highlight the barbarity of the regime, the BBC was 
seemingly trying to rationalise it. Writing to the Corporation at the time of Burnett’s 
White Africa, South Africa media expert Len Clarke complained that the programme 
had presented ‘the “Liberal” viewpoint…far too frequently, giving the impression that 
liberals abound in South Africa, when in fact they are almost extinct’.110 For Clarke, 
the BBC was failing to see the extremism of apartheid, presenting it instead from 
within its own understanding of political normality.  Clarke complained, ‘It was rather 
like a film of Nazi Germany which shows Jews painted with the Star of David, but 
fails to mention the concentration camps’.111   
 
Clarke’s observation helps to characterize British broadcasting’s stance on apartheid 
more generally, specifically concerning the tendency to soften the realities of the 
regime so that it could be rendered within ‘the liberal imagination’, in terms that 
British broadcasters found familiar and comprehensible.  Trying to make sense of 
apartheid on British terms meant explaining the regime as a reasonable entity, thereby 
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masking its barbarity and irrationality.  It was this tendency that ultimately shaped 
British output on apartheid, both that which was meant to be neutral and that which 
was subtly intended not to be.    
 
The ‘liberal imagination’ prioritised the ethnic affinity between Britons and South 
Africans, an idea which played out through broadcasting, especially in discussions 
about whether it was fair to deny programmes to the South Africans which were seen 
as core to their identity as (almost) Britons.  For example, when it proved impossible 
for broadcasters to relay coverage of the wedding of Charles and Diana to South 
Africa, because of the involvement of members of Equity and the Musician’s Union, 
there was an outcry at the denial of this service.  Derek Bond, ex-President of Equity, 
told the Daily Mail:  ‘About half the population of South Africa is basically British 
and desperately loyal…To deny them of this coverage is absolutely inconceivable’.112  
In parliament, Ian Lloyd led 25 Conservative MPs to sign a Commons motion in 
protest.113  Similar thinking made broadcasters reluctant to deny to the South Africans 
other high points of British culture.  When, in 1977, Peter Hain asked the BBC not to 
relay the FA Cup final to South Africa because it would provide ‘a morale-boosting 
fillip to the white minority’, Charles Curran was not convinced.114  The Corporation, 
he told one Union leader, was ‘in the business of communication’ and was not 
                                                        
112 Stuart Collier, ‘Royal Wedding TV Ban on South Africa’, Daily Mail, 11 Jul. 1981. 
113 Hansard (Commons), Vol: 146, Col: 7689, 21 Jul. 1981. 
114 This was part of Hain’s broader work promoting the sports boycott as Chairman of the Action 
Committee against Racism.   WAC, T66/119/1, South Africa Press Office, Hain to Curran, 22 Apr. 1977.  
See Peter Hain, Don’t Play with Apartheid:  the Background to the Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign 
(London, 1971). 
 34 
prepared ‘to resort to political discrimination’ by stopping the broadcast from 
reaching South Africa.115 
 
So far as news and current affairs was concerned, British broadcasters were too often 
determined to believe that affinities between the nations meant that they could deal 
with the apartheid regime as a reasonable partner, were too wedded to the idea that 
there must be two sides to the South African story, and that balance was an 
appropriate technique to establish truth.  Confronted by a regime that was a 
manipulative, brutal pariah, British broadcasters looked for, and saw instead, a 
reflection of themselves, injecting reason and rationality where there was none to be 
found.  This tendency was prevalent in British state responses to apartheid more 
broadly, as the South African regime was treated as if it was itself liberal and decent.  
In 1957 the British High Commissioner in South Africa told the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations that senior officers in the South African Police Force were, 
‘for the most part good and reasonable men’.116  As late as 1985, Malcolm Rifkind 
(Minister of State at the Foreign Office), following pleas to intervene in South 
African ‘treason trials’ against anti-apartheid activists, explained that he still 
considered that the South African judiciary ‘enjoy[ed] considerable independence’.117 
 
No broadcaster illustrates this tendency and its consequences better than the BBC’s 
Editor of News and Current Affairs, later the Assistant Director General, Alan 
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Protheroe, whose determination to see the Apartheid State as a fair broker (and 
belated realisation that it was impossible to do so) does much to highlight British 
attitudes writ-large.  Protheroe was a conservative figure, deeply wedded to the 
BBC’s principles of neutrality, a Territorial Army colonel who, Simon Jenkins 
reported in The Times, ‘would be well cast as a Tory agent’.118  Determined to protect 
the BBC’s ability to operate within South Africa, Protheroe made a series of visits to 
the country to meet high profile government figures during the State of Emergency.  
These visits convinced him that British broadcasters should show the regime the 
courtesy of legal cooperation, following liberal principles of fair play.  Returning 
from a visit in 1985, Protheroe told the News and Current Affairs weekly meeting that 
there was a ‘genuine concern in South African governmental circles about the 
perceived effects of the censorship’ in the State of Emergency.119  Believing the State 
of Emergency to be an environment where the BBC could operate, Protheroe called 
for staff to be ‘meticulous’ in their observation of South African restrictions while 
‘protesting about any attempt to extend their application’.120  Protheroe saw two sides 
to the apartheid story.  He reported back to the BBC that the ANC representative he 
had met while in South Africa had ‘brushed aside my mild question about which 
African country would be the model for black rule’.121  Moreover, Protheroe thought 
that broadcasters were to some extent responsible for the breakdown in relations with 
the regime. He explained to BBC colleagues: 
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There is a long history of misunderstanding with (quite incontrovertibly) 
largish helpings of BBC malpractice there….The South Africans maintain 
they are not unhappy about being criticised:  but criticism should be the 
outcome of accurate investigation and fair reportage, and the BBC, of all 
organisations, should be the objective and impartial reporter.122 
 
According to Protheroe’s thinking, South Africa’s government was, at least to some 
extent, a fair broker in a conflict, an idea that was rooted in a broader British inability 
to see the unreasonable core of apartheid.  
 
As skilled and determined media manipulators, who had dedicated a fortune to trying 
to improve coverage in the international arena, the South African regime was more 
than capable of exploiting this kind of naivety, a reality epitomised by the history of 
Last Grave at Dimbaza. BBC commitment to neutrality had prompted the 
Corporation to contact the South African Embassy in advance of the screening of 
what was initially an hour-long film to ask if they would like to send a representative 
to contribute to the post-film discussion.  The Embassy, however, tapped into the 
BBC’s liberal principles to secure a far better deal as we have seen, shrinking Last 
Grave at Dimbaza to under half an hour and filling the extra time with a film of their 
own.  JV Delport, the Embassy’s Director of Information, knew exactly what buttons 
he was pressing when he responded to the Man Alive team:  ‘I would have thought 
that one’s concern (in terms of the concept of British fair play) is shown by showing 
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for the same length of time in the same programme a film on the same subject as seen 
through the eyes of the South African government’.123 
 
It was left to Len Clarke to point out to the BBC the realities of what they had 
allowed to happen.  Following the broadcasting of South Africa: Two Points of View, 
Clarke wrote to Director General Charles Curran telling him that ‘the time is overdue 
for the BBC to realise that South Africa with probably the world’s most skilled and 
best-financed propaganda ministry, may have found chinks in the BBC’s armour of 
impartiality’.124 While the apartheid state was manipulating the BBC into showing its 
own propaganda, the Corporation was trapped in a mentality where it saw competing 
interests in South Africa as two sides in a game of cricket.  Production notes for the 
programme highlighted the importance of looking at the rival films in the correct 
‘batting order’.125  Responding to the BBC’s decision to allow the South African 
government to broadcast its own response to Last Grave at Dimbaza, Adam Raphael 
in the Guardian complained, ‘South Africa’s propaganda counter-offensive scores its 
biggest coup tonight’.  For Raphael and others, the BBC had missed the point about 
what the South African regime truly was, and how it should be treated.  After all, he 
concluded, ‘The South African Broadcasting Corporation is not about to give equal 
time to those it attacks nightly’.126   
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It was not, however, only the BBC that struggled to understand that the apartheid state 
could not be taken at its word.  In 1973, Robert Moore, Senior Lecturer in Sociology 
at the University of Aberdeen, wrote to the IBA questioning whether it was legally 
and morally correct to allow the advertising of holidays in South Africa given that 
Black viewers would not be allowed to partake of these products.127  Fearing that 
Moore’s critique might have illuminated a breach of race relations and/or advertising 
standards legislation, Lord Aylestone (Chairman of the IBA) wrote to the South 
African Tourist Corporation asking them to clarify the position.128 The South 
Africans duly affirmed that Black tourists ‘were welcome to stay in any hotel of their 
choice’ and the IBA took them at their word, telling another anti-apartheid letter 
writer that they had received a ‘categorical assurance’ from the South African Tourist 
Corporation on the matter.129   
 
Of course, in reality, this assurance was a nonsense, but, like the BBC, the IBA was 
seemingly unable to comprehend the extent to which the apartheid state could not be 
trusted.    Notes from a meeting between the IBA and the South African Tourist Board 
two years later recorded a different reality, that there would be no discrimination 
because ‘anyone who was likely to find themselves subject to South African racial 
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laws would discover this at the entry permit stage’.130  Seemingly unmoved by this 
significant difference, the IBA continued to broadcast commercials which offered 
products to white Britons only. All the while, the banning of political advertising 
meant that requests from the Anti-Apartheid Movement to secure advertising time on 
ITV were consistently declined. 
 
This positioning by the IBA and the BBC may betray a British brand of racism, or 
apologism for the apartheid regime.  But it is perhaps better understood as a product 
of being trapped in a particular post-imperial mind-frame, wherein a liberal 
commitment to broadcasting detachment could not withstand, or sometimes even 
understand, the barrage of propaganda and intimidation that came from apartheid 
South Africa.  This was a tendency that similarly permeated inter state relations.  
Incredulous that Environment Minister, Patrick Jenkin, had accepted South African 
assurances in 1985 that they would dismantle measures of petty apartheid, the Anti-
Apartheid Movement’s David Kenvyn wrote that he was ‘saddened that a Minister of 
Crown should fall such an easy victim to the racists’ propaganda’.131 
 
In this environment, the position of broadcasters, of maintaining the Greene dictum, 
of defending neutrality, of subtle challenge, was untenable.  In 1986, this reality was 
exposed by challenges made to the guardian of neutral news broadcasting Alan 
Protheroe, following an appearance on the Radio 4 programme, Feedback.  In this 
programme, Protheroe was criticised by a listener who complained that coverage of 
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South Africa was ‘totally biased against the whites there’.132  Protheroe answered the 
charge with a response that tried to mesh together Greene’s dictum with the principle 
of neutrality.  He claimed:  
 
…the BBC is not impartial as regards apartheid.  I think it was Sir Hugh 
Greene when he was Director General, made a very plain statement that the 
BBC could not be impartial about things like apartheid and it could not be 
impartial about the straightforward issues of law and order.  There’s no 
impartiality in that.  There is, however, in the reporting, we insist on a degree 
of neutrality.  In other words, we insist on reporting as fully as we can the 
actions, the events, the philosophies, the ideologies and the developments of 
both sides, and that it is critically important, and we have done that over a 
very, very, long period of years. 
 
This response summed up the tangle that broadcasters had fallen into as regards 
apartheid and highlighted the limits of the liberal imagination, which was crumbling 
in the face of challenges from all sides.  It was seized upon by listeners who were 
astonished to hear a senior BBC news executive seemingly confirm that the 
Corporation was not unambiguously committed to the principle of impartiality.  On 
the following edition of Feedback, presenter Chris Dunkley explained that responses 
to Protheroe’s interview had been ‘immediate, irate, and almost entirely consistent’.  
He read out a typical letter from one listener who recalled reacting with ‘absolute 
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amazement’.  The listener complained, ‘How dare he [Protheroe] assume…that 
everyone in this country sees South Africa as he does?’133   
 
Protheroe’s broadcast soon came to the attention of the Chairman of the Conservative 
Party, Norman Tebbit.  Tebbit wrote to Alasdair Milne, then Director General, asking 
for reassurance that the BBC’s values were not being eroded ‘by it being seen to be 
partial in what we both believe is a good cause’.134  Responding in the News and 
Current Affairs meeting, Protheroe explained that ‘what he should have said was that 
the BBC had no view on any issue, and would seek to maintain its impartial stance 
across the board’.  Meanwhile, Milne assured Tebbit that Protheroe’s position on 
apartheid, as broadcast on Feedback, was ‘not consistent with the BBC’s policy’.135 
Milne’s response, however, was not sufficient to quiet Tebbit.  Unable, through a 
second letter, to gain what he considered a clear answer from Milne or Protheroe 
(about whether Protheroe had spoken on behalf of the BBC), and having failed to 
secure a public apology, Tebbit wrote for a third time to Milne as well as to the new 
Chairman of the BBC Board of Governors, Marmaduke Hussey.136  Tebbit listed a 
series of questions which he insisted the Corporation should answer ‘with a straight 
“yes” or “no” and “only by a simple yes or no”’, relating to its stance on apartheid.137 
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Milne responded that he was ‘puzzled’ by Tebbit’s ‘persistence in this matter’, 
perhaps a thinly-veiled accusation of support for apartheid, but he did answer the 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions, confirming that Protheroe had spoken on behalf of the BBC 
but that the BBC’s position on apartheid was neutral. 
 
Tebbit’s protracted engagement with this issue might, as Milne implied, tell us 
something about his government’s attitude to the apartheid state.138  It certainly 
illuminated Conservative disaffection with what was perceived as leftist bias in the 
BBC, concerns that had led to the appointment of Hussey, and would soon lead to 
Milne’s (forced) resignation only days after his reply to Tebbit’s ‘yes/no’ letter.139  
Conservative concerns were not primarily about South Africa, but this particular 
correspondence clearly hit a nerve.  
 
Like Milne, Protheroe prematurely left his role at the BBC in 1987, driven out by 
Conservative complaints about news bias.140 As a man who was instinctively inclined 
to pursue a neutral approach to apartheid, it had dawned on him only very slowly that 
the State of Emergency in South Africa was inherently unreasonable and could not be 
processed within the BBC’s traditional frames of neutrality and balance.  Writing in 
exasperation to the Director General in 1985, Protheroe explained that he now 
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realised that South African laws ‘enable the security service to do anything they like 
to anyone they like’.141 Protheroe’s belated ability to see apartheid South Africa for 
what it was, reflected far wider currents of broadcasting, and broader British, 
responses to apartheid. Meanwhile, his (and Milne’s) departure from the BBC, 
highlight the British state’s on-going commitment to neutrality (as the government of 
the day perceived it), a commitment still underpinned by a fracturing liberal 
imagination. 
 
The extremism of the apartheid state could not be processed easily within the mind-
frame of this ‘liberal imagination’.  Facing something that was fundamentally 
irrational, British broadcasters tried to square circles with little success, mostly failing 
to present the realities of life in South Africa to the British public.  When Michael 
Buerk returned to Britain after his expulsion from South Africa, he was asked by the 
new editor of the documentary series Everyman, Jane Drabble, to make a programme 
reflecting on his time there.142  Through the vehicle of Everyman, which was made in 
the BBC’s Religious Affairs department, Buerk managed to show footage of a 
township murder that BBC News had ‘refused to broadcast’ because it was too 
shocking.143  Fearing BBC proscription, Buerk recalled his relief that the murder was 
not cut out from this programme at least, as BBC managers instead argued about the 
frequent inclusion of the word ‘fuck’ in the dialogue.  As apartheid raged on, amid a 
liberal inability to comprehend its horror, BBC executives debated whether the bad 
language of South African streets was appropriate for broadcast in British homes.  
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‘Sometimes’, Buerk recollected, ‘I felt I was in a world as Kafkaesque as that of the 
apartheid bureaucrats, if better intentioned’.144   
 
Ultimately, the ‘liberal imagination’ restricted the parameters of British engagement 
with apartheid.  Unable to recognise or respond to the realities of the regime, Britain 
retreated to what it did understand, paternalistic ‘liberal’ empire, rooted in a 
commitment to gradual change, fair play and an instinctive weariness of all hues of 
radicalism.   In this atmosphere, while anti-apartheid protesters who knew better 
banged at the doors of Westminster and Broadcasting House, Britain sustained, in 
broadcasting and in politics, a working, if increasingly fraught, relationship with the 
apartheid state until its demise.  This relationship was underpinned by constructions 
of affinity, by shared interests, and by varying degrees of British sympathy for the 
racial predicament of South Africa’s whites.   Looking from afar at South Africa as 
children of its lost Empire, Britain saw and projected visions of itself, and mostly 
failed to see the brutal realities of the apartheid regime.  
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